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Fresh evidence about how cells in frontal cortex make
decisions has come from experiments in which
information is partly withheld from them.
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We tend to think of decisions as agonised and protracted
processes, as when deciding where to go on holiday. But
such scenarios represent only a very tiny proportion of the
incessant decisions that we make subconsciously. For
instance, whenever we move our gaze to a new visual
target a choice has been made between all the possible
objects around us that might be worth looking at; and as
we make two or three such movements every second of
our waking lives, this alone represents a rather impressive
degree of decisiveness. And these are just decisions about
movement: all the time we are also making sensory
decisions about what we think is out there, on the basis of
information from our senses. 
Precisely because the processes leading up to these
decisions are hidden from us, we enjoy a robust, confi-
dent picture of the world that belies the fact that sensory
signals are uncertain, the consequences of actions unpre-
dictable. We think we see, but actually we guess. As
Venn [1] pointed out in 1907: “What an ordinary glance
takes in, when directed towards a surface, is nothing more than
a succession of points which are filled in and supplemented by
something other than sight. How obstinately our senses refuse to
undertake the drudgery of examining every separate detail in the
objects we inspect, even when we are gazing upon them with
some care, is only too well known to those who have ever worked
through a proof sheet as it came from the press. The almost
inevitable impulse is to visualize a few letters and thence to
infer the whole word, and even from part of a sentence to infer
the rest and it requires a strong and persistent effort to insist
that the eye shall not thus shirk its work of adequate observa-
tion”. Thus, perception is a matter of hypotheses that
must be judged against one another, by seeing which are
best supported by whatever meagre clues filter through
our senses.
As a result of this decision-making process, our reaction
times are much longer than would be expected from
simple consideration of the delays in sensory receptors,
muscles, and the nerve fibres and synapses that link them
up. Procrastination rules: cortical levels of the brain keep
the lower ones in check while they evolve their own
responses, more sophisticated than the lower levels are
capable of achieving, but taking longer to compute. Quan-
titative analysis of these reaction times, in particular of the
random variation that is such a prominent feature of them,
leads to a simple model of the underlying process, the
LATER — for ‘linear approach to threshold with ergodic
rate’ — model [2,3]. Here, information arriving from the
stimulus causes a decision signal to rise linearly from an
initial level to a criterion or threshold level, at which the
response is triggered. On different trials the rate of rise is
subject to Gaussian variation, which accurately predicts
the observed distribution of reaction times.
Figure 1
Activity of a neuron in frontal cortex during a movement discrimination
task. The monkey fixated a spot (blue, at top) while above it a pattern
of moving dots was presented. The pattern was extinguished, and after
a delay the monkey made a saccade to one of the targets (red) on the
right or left, depending on whether it judged the motion to be to the
right or left. During the trial the activity of a saccade-related neuron
with a movement field (pink) that included one of the two targets was
recorded. The difficulty of the task could be altered by specifying the
percentage of dots moving in the required direction, rather than simply
moving at random: these percentages are shown at the left. In each
row across, the shaded area represents the period during which the
motion was presented, and the vertical green line represents the time
of the saccade. Each line of black ticks represents the pattern of action
potentials recorded during one trial. On the left, trials in which the
saccade was made into the response field (RF) of the neuron being
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To have any scientific value, such a model needs to be
more than a mere empirical generalisation: it has to make
functional sense. One approach to evaluating function is to
ask how an ideal system for making decisions would
behave. Mathematically, this process of updating one’s
estimates of the likelihoods of different hypotheses in the
light of new evidence can be described by Bayes’ Law.
When an event E is observed, which provides evidence
about some hypothesis H, the likelihood L(H) of the
hypothesis is increased by a factor proportional to
p(E|H)/p(E), the probability of observing E, if H were
true, normalised by the probability of E itself. Every time
E is repeated, L(H) will increase by the same factor. Thus,
if H is the hypothesis that a certain stimulus is present,
then the continuing appearance of the stimulus will give
rise to sensory stimulation — evidence E concerning H —
that will cause L(H) to rise. Final acceptance of the truth
of H could then correspond to L(H) attaining some fixed
criterion or significance level.
The parallel with the LATER model is obvious: its linear
rate of rise corresponds to the arrival of evidence, the start-
ing level to the prior likelihood L(H), and the threshold to
the significance level at which H is accepted to be true,
and action is initiated. Studies in which the prior probabil-
ity of targets is systematically altered [4] confirm this cor-
respondence quantitatively, and experiments recently
carried out in my lab by Ben Reddi similarly appear to
demonstrate that the threshold level is indeed altered by
changing the degree of urgency, substituting speed for
accuracy. The only puzzling feature is the random varia-
tion of rate of rise from trial to trial, which appears to be
due, not to noise in sensory signals, but to a process of gra-
tuitous randomisation within the brain. But it results in
randomness of choice between competing possibilities,
and there are good biological reasons for making our
actions to a certain extent unpredictable [3]. 
The ultimate test of a quantitative model such as LATER
is, of course, whether there are neurons in the brain that
actually behave in the way that is predicted. The initial
level of their activity should correspond to prior expecta-
tion, and on presenting a stimulus should rise at a rate that
is influenced by the rate of arrival of information but also
subject to random variation; the time for this activity to
reach some fixed level should predict the reaction time. A
movement that is particularly appropriate for this kind of
study is the saccade, the rapid eye movement that shifts
the gaze on to a new target. In the frontal eye fields of
monkeys, one set of neurons fulfils some of these predic-
tions rather exactly [5]. These movement cells show a
steady build-up of activity just before an appropriate
saccade, the rate of rise varying randomly from trial to trial,
and the saccade is initiated when the activity reaches a
fixed threshold level with a reaction time predicted by the
time-course of the activity of the cell itself.
Another class of cells — visual cells — shows a similar but
earlier rise in activity after stimulus presentation [6]. The
time course here is typically more complex, with the
activity reflecting the successive contribution of different
kinds of information. For instance, in a distractor task, in
which the monkey is trained to make saccades to only a
certain class of target (for instance red rather than green,
green then being the distractor), the response to the
distractor consists of an preliminary, hopeful, rise in
response to the initial information that a target is present,
followed by a disappointed decline when the neuron
finally discovers that the stimulus is green and not red.
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Figure 2
Activity of a frontal eye field neuron in a different discrimination task.
The monkey initially fixated a central spot (red). Then four different
targets were presented, being all possible combinations of two
different shapes and two different colours: the monkey had been
trained to make a saccade to one of them, in this case a black cross. At
the right, the individual lines of dots show the pattern of action
potentials in each of a number of trials, the rows being sorted
according to saccadic reaction time (the time of the saccade is shown
by the green segments forming the S-shaped curve). The four sets of
data correspond to the presentation of each of the four possible
targets within the cell’s receptive field (pink). Below, the average
activity for trials is shown on the same time-scale, for each of the four
cases. Activity rises similarly in each case, but falls off subsequently to
a degree that depends on the degree of similarity between the target
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Two recent papers [7,8] have shed considerable light on
the neural mechanisms of these processes. Both studied
saccade-related visual units in monkey frontal cortex to
see what happens when the quantity of information avail-
able concerning a stimulus is systematically altered. Kim
and Shadlen [7] chose a movement discrimination task, in
which a proportion of dots within a field moved together
in one direction, while the others moved at random: the
amount of information available can then be varied simply
by altering the proportion of dots that move together. The
monkeys were trained to make a saccade to one of two
possible targets, depending on the perceived direction of
motion (Figure 1). Bichot and Schall [8] used a task in
which the correct target was defined by the conjunction of
two attributes, colour and shape — for example, a white
circle — and studied the responses evoked by stimuli
which only partly met the criterion, for example a black
circle or a white cross. In a typical trial, all four possibili-
ties were presented at equal distances from the fixation
spot, thus creating a more complex version of the distrac-
tor task described earlier (Figure 2).
What ought to happen? In both these experiments, what is
being manipulated is the amount of information supplied:
either in terms of the proportion of dots moving in the
designated direction, or in terms of the fraction of
constituent attributes that are actually present. In the
latter case, Bichot and Schall [8] found the initial response
of their units to be very similar, whatever the type of stim-
ulus. But about 120 milliseconds from the time of presen-
tation, the behaviour started to diverge: by around 200
milliseconds, the degree of activity falls into three clear
groups (Figure 2). The greatest activity was when the
target was indeed present; when only one of the two con-
stituent components occurred (same colour or same shape)
the activity was decreased; when neither was present, it
was decreased still further.
As this second decrease was roughly the same as the first,
it suggests — as would be expected on theoretical
grounds, and has been observed empirically [4] — that
probability in these units is coded on a logarithmic scale.
It is important to realise that these are not the same class
of cells described by Hanes and Schall [5] that embody
the LATER model itself: rather, they are likely to repre-
sent the visual signal that feeds into the movement cells,
and would be expected therefore to alter the mean rate of
rise of their activity. Clearly it will be important to verify
whether this is so.
Kim and Shadlen [7] presented a greater range of variation
of information, but the analysis they performed was less
direct than that of Bichot and Schall [8]. Once again
(Figure 1) it can be seen that, during the presentation of
the motion, the activity in the unit either rose or fell,
depending on whether the motion was towards or away
from the target area, the rate of change depending on the
proportion of spots providing information about the
motion. From their records, the authors calculate an index
representing the extent to which — moment by
moment — the degree of activity of the cell correctly
predicted the ensuing saccade (Figure 3). It is then very
clear that the rate of rise of this index increased with
increasing information, the relationship once again being
very roughly logarithmic.
In both cases, then, we can see decisions evolving in these
neurons in response to partial information, in a way that
seems to fit broadly with the kind of scheme represented
by the LATER model. In addition, Bichot and Schall [8]
have demonstrated a further property of these cells that is
related to learning. In the theoretical framework for deci-
sion given earlier, it was assumed that the various values
of p(E|H) were somehow known in advance. Of course in
real life they must be learnt through experience, and this
is what constitutes the learning that occurs when we
change the reward from say a white circle to a black cross.
Such changes of reward leave behind temporary traces of
increased p(E|H), evident as a residual elevation of the
level of activity for a stimulus that used to be the
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Figure 3
Accumulation of information by frontal neurons. The six lines plot the
probability of correctly predicting the final saccade direction from
averaged neuronal activity at different times after the onset of the
motion (shaded area), for the six levels of difficulty of discrimination
shown at the right: the numbers have the same meaning as in Figure 1.
The easier the discrimination, the more rapidly this probability rises at
























rewarded target but is no longer. This exciting finding
opens up the possibility of a new way of studying this
fundamental kind of medium-term sensory memory.
Indeed this rigorously quantitative approach — securely
triangulated by theory, by behaviour, and by actual
neuronal behaviour — is surely the way that our
understanding of the highest levels of the brain will
progress into the millennium.
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